Economics & Finance · Interdisciplinary & Society
Theoretical Economics
The newest papers in Theoretical Economics that ReadSearch has read, newest first. Each links to its own page, with its authors, date, where it was published and the original.
28 papers, from 4 September 2026 to 4 November 2026: 28 arXiv preprints.
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Newest papers
Polynomial-Time Computation of Extensive-Form Proper Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
We give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact extensive-form proper equilibrium in a finite two-player zero-sum extensive-form game with perfect recall and rational data.Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Colonel Blotto Games
Colonel Blotto is a fundamental resource-allocation game in which two players divide their budgets across battlefields, and the higher allocation on each battlefield wins its value.Neural networks and games
Hopfield neural networks and noncooperative games provide seemingly different approaches to understanding how collective outcomes emerge from local interactions.Classification Aggregation with Multiple Memberships
People face the problem of classifying objects into categories while aggregating their opinions.Learning AI Agents, Market Makers, and Stress in Automated Markets
Automated markets increasingly route order flow from learning trading agents through automated market makers (AMMs).Persistence of Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Model
Classical theory predicts that irrational traders lose money to rational traders and are eventually driven out of the market.Algorithmic Monoculture in Machine Learning-based Site-Specific Fertilizer Recommendation
Machine learning recommendations are often evaluated one model at a time, despite deployment across interconnected decision makers.Monetizing Intelligence: Advertising and Subscription Design on LLM Platforms
Large language model (LLM) platforms introducing advertising must decide how much capability ad revenue should fund and what consumers should pay to avoid ads.A Stationary Mean-Field Model for Carbon Market Stability Reserve
We formulate the design of a market stability reserve as a stationary mean-field singular control problem.Proportionality in Ranking Compression
Motivated by applications in reinforcement learning from human feedback, we consider a setting where a given collection of rankings needs to be compressed into a smaller collection of rankings.Extending Myerson's Optimal Auctions to Correlated Bidders via Neural Network Interpolation
We aim to design revenue-maximizing single-item auctions that are deterministic, strategy-proof, and ex post individually rational --- the quintessential fundamental model for optimal mechanism…Designing Experiments for External Decision Makers
Standard Bayesian experimental design (BED) methods assume the experimenter alone will act on the data, choosing the best action given their own beliefs and goals.Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties.Better together? A performance theory of human-machine skill policies under generalization difficulty
Organizations pairing a human and a machine on a task decide, often by default, which executes each instance and what happens when both do.The False Allure of "Security by Obscurity": A Game-Theoretic Approach
"Security by obscurity," or the idea that hiding how a system works helps protect it from adversaries, has long been poorly regarded in the security community.Dynamic Matching with Abandonment: Optimal Guarantees via Static Priority Policies
We study stochastic dynamic matching with abandonment, a fundamental model in which agents of different types arrive over time, may abandon the market while waiting, and can be matched in pairs for…When Does Randomized Oversight Align AI Agents That Can Conceal?
Oversight changes the evidence it relies on.The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when there are more students who prefer the same school than the number of seats available.Optimal Networks for Agentic Information Aggregation
We study information aggregation in the networked learning model introduced by Kearns, Roth, and Ryu (SODA 2026).Multi-Dimensional Matching
We study a matching mechanism where agents and objects are described by features rather than complete rankings.