OpenAlex ·
On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors
- Published
- Source
- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2610.07858
- Original
- Read it at the publisher
- Topics
Abstract
We show that computing an approximate mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete first-price auction with correlated priors is PPAD-complete. The key intermediate step in our reduction is the PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a new normal-form game, the hypergraph discrete first-price auction, which may be of independent interest.
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