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On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors

Mark Chen, Xi Chen, Hao Cui, William Pires and Jonah Stockwell

Published
Source
OpenAlex
Published in
arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2610.07858
Original
Read it at the publisher
Topics
EconometricsGeneral EconomicsOptimization & Control

Abstract

We show that computing an approximate mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete first-price auction with correlated priors is PPAD-complete. The key intermediate step in our reduction is the PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a new normal-form game, the hypergraph discrete first-price auction, which may be of independent interest.

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