OpenAlex ·
An Improved Upper Bound for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade via Recursive Hard Instances
- Published
- Source
- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2610.06547
- Original
- Read it at the publisher
- Topics
Abstract
We study the worst-case efficiency of the random-offerer mechanism in bilateral trade relative to the first-best gains from trade. We construct a family of independent buyer value and seller cost distributions whose ratio converges to $0.436943488\ldots$, improving the previous upper bound of $0.460242308\ldots$. Our construction combines recursively nested seller distributions with downward transport of buyer values. The recursive structure allows contributions from different scales to accumulate, leading to stronger hard instances. We analyze this construction through a recurrence and obtain an analytic characterization of the limiting constant.
The authors’ abstract, as arXiv lists it. arXiv’s listings, abstracts included, are free for anyone to reuse.
Read it on ReadSearch
Each opens after you create an account, and brings you back to this paper.
More in Econometrics
Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation
Personalized Recommendations Without Inducing Congestion: Mitigating Disparities in the NYC High School Match
Synthetic Cultural Agents from Aggregate Anchors
On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors
Verified, not generated: expert-verified AI study materials and the distribution of learning gains in a university course
Get the few papers worth your time in Econometrics every morning.
ReadSearch reads the new papers in your field each day and brings you the few worth reading, each with its key finding in a sentence.