OpenAlex ·

The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium in Network Congestion and Coordination Games

Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas and Jingming Yan

Published
Source
OpenAlex
Published in
arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2609.33225
Original
Read it at the publisher
Topics
Computational ComplexityEconometricsGeneral EconomicsOptimization & Control

Abstract

We show that computing a Nash equilibrium is CLS-complete for linear network congestion and network coordination games. As a result, finding a KKT point of a bilinear polynomial is CLS-complete.

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