OpenAlex ·
From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from Trade
- Published
- Source
- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2609.30702
- Original
- Read it at the publisher
- Topics
Abstract
We study gains from trade in matching markets with independent private values and costs, Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and no expected budget deficit. A second-best guarantee for finite bilateral trade extends without loss to matching markets with independent Borel priors, arbitrary downward-closed feasibility, and finite expected first-best gains. For bounded buyers with monotone hazard rates and arbitrary bounded sellers, we determine the exact worst-case ratio of second-best to first-best gains, approximately $0.72490721$. For binary buyers and sellers with at most $m$ types, we determine the exact ratio for every $m$, including $8/9$ when $m=2$ and a limit of $4/5$ as $m$ grows. Both families of bounds are tight already in bilateral trade.
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