OpenAlex ·
Minimally rational reallocation of objects
- Published
- Source
- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2609.28174
- Original
- Read it at the publisher
- Topics
Abstract
Matching theory has largely evolved around two canonical rules: deferred acceptance (DA) in the marriage problem and top trading cycles (TTC) in the object reallocation problem. Although the two rules operate through different procedures, we show that they rest on a common axiomatic foundation. In the marriage problem, stability decomposes into individual rationality and pair rationality, and a classic result characterizes DA by these two axioms together with strategy-proofness for the proposing side. We show that individual rationality, pair rationality, and strategy-proofness likewise characterize TTC. More strongly, three weak rationality axioms concerning individuals and pairs, together with strategy-proofness, uniquely determine TTC. Even weak rationality requirements therefore rule out strategy-proof implementation when there is a cap on the size of exchange cycles.
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