OpenAlex ·
Pacing Equilibria in Abstract Mechanisms
- Published
- Source
- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2609.27285
- Original
- Read it at the publisher
- Topics
Abstract
Digital platforms increasingly rely on automated budget-management systems to regulate participation across allocation opportunities. A common tool is multiplicative pacing, which scales buyers' bids so that campaign-level budgets are spent gradually. Although pacing is operationally simple, its aggregate behavior depends on the underlying mechanism. In first-price single-item auction markets, pacing enjoys strong structural and computational properties that often fail in second-price auctions. It is unclear whether these properties extend to richer platform mechanisms. We develop a unified theory of pacing equilibria across a hierarchy of mechanisms. We first show that, even in first-price position auctions, the market-equilibrium interpretation of the single-item benchmark can fail. We then identify bid-maximizing pay-your-bid mechanisms as a broad class in which pacing equilibria exist, are unique, and admit an Eisenberg-Gale-type convex-program characterization. This implies efficient computation, Pareto-efficiency, and liquid-welfare guarantees, enabling pacing integration into large-scale optimization-based allocation routines. Finally, for abstract mechanisms satisfying a payment monotonicity condition, we prove equilibrium existence by smoothing discontinuities. With additional conditions and appropriate tie-breaking, we obtain uniqueness, revenue maximality among budget-feasible pacing vectors, and shill-proof implementability, and provide convergent budget-adjustment dynamics for approximate equilibria. Overall, many favorable properties of first-price pacing extend beyond single-item auctions under appropriate mechanism-level conditions.
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