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The prospect of a fair outcome triggers prosocial behaviour in the Centipede Game
- Published
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- OpenAlex
- Published in
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2609.39426
- Original
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- Topics
Abstract
Human decision-making reflects not only material incentives, but also concern for others' gains and the ability to understand others. However, the extent to which sensitivity to fairness interacts with aspects of social cognition and affects sequential social interactions requires further understanding. Here, we address this question through a behavioural experiment on sequential exchanges of resources, represented by the Incremental Centipede Game (ICG). The design comprises a "zero-end" treatment (n=164), where the ICG has a deadline yielding no payoff, and a "fair-end" treatment (n=162), where the last interaction leads to a fair outcome. The ICG, which is repeated twice, is complemented by two individual tasks: the Social Value Orientation task (SVO), to elicit social preferences, and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), to assess participants' deliberation. Our results show that the fair outcome, though uncertain, prompts participants to move beyond self-interest. Indeed, an evolutionary model shows that the fair split shifts play towards a mutually beneficial strategy when players are sufficiently prosocial and use probabilistic strategies. A second game repetition reinforces this pattern, with adaptation towards cooperation. Although CRT scores do not predict behaviour in the ICG, participants who deviate from game-theoretic rationality exhibit stronger prosociality in the SVO. Notably, in the fair-end treatment, some non-rational players are individualists, suggesting that the fair split may function as a nudge. In conclusion, our findings suggest that certain personal traits, such as social preferences, allow individuals to overcome self-interest to better align with their peers and achieve better collective outcomes in mixed-motive games.
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