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Almost Envy-Freeness for Additive Mixed Manna with Entitlements: Deterministic and Randomized Guarantees

Zehan Lin, Shengxin Liu, Biaoshuai Tao and Shengwei Zhou

Published
Source
OpenAlex
Published in
arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2609.02724
Original
Read it at the publisher
Topics
Artificial IntelligenceComputational ComplexityEconometricsGeneral Economics

Abstract

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with asymmetric entitlements in mixed manna settings, where the items consist of both goods and chores. For additive valuations, we establish that weighted envy-free up to one item (WEF1) allocations always exist and can be computed in polynomial time. We also study fair and efficient allocation and show that weighted envy-freeness up to one transfer (WEF1T) is compatible with fractional Pareto optimality (fPO) for every mixed-manna instance. This relaxation from WEF1 to WEF1T is tight, as demonstrated by our impossibility result. We further show a best-of-both-worlds result via a finite lottery that guarantees weighted envy-freeness (WEF) in expectation, with every realized allocation satisfying WEF1T and achieving the tight characterization complemented by the existing impossibility result.

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