OpenAlex ·

HermiCache: Enclave-Aware Cache Replacement for Trusted Execution Environments

Oussama Elmnaouri, Pascal Cotret, Vianney Lapôtre and Loïc Lagadec

Published
Source
OpenAlex
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2609.10634
Original
Read it at the publisher
Topics
Artificial IntelligenceHardware Architecture

Abstract

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) protect enclave memory from untrusted software but remain vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks due to shared microarchitectural resources. Existing countermeasures use techniques such as cache partitioning or randomization: these solutions are not ideal if a designer wants fine-grained configurations and a deterministic protection. In this paper, we introduce HermiCache which is an answer to these requirements. HermiCache is designed for RISC-V cores and has been implemented in the OpenHwGroup CVA6 core with a Keystone TEE for the software layer. The solution has an area overhead of 6% on the processor core.

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